Allure of battle
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writer was trying to simplify many complicated issues and in the process delivering judgements
Reviewed in the United States on January 18, 2021
Allure of Battle-Journal of Book Reviews: a massive military history book reviewed
Authored by Agha H Amin
6" x 9" (15.24 x 22.86 cm)
Black & White on White paper
ISBN-13: 978-1729770986
ISBN-10: 1729770983
This is a very interesting book that I immediately decided to procure after hearing about it from some friends.
The writer is a seasoned and accomplished historian from Canada.
The book as far as I understand rightfully won a prestigious award -Gilder Lehrman Prize for Military History.
“The $50,000 prize co-sponsored by the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History and the New York Historical Society.”
The writer sums up the confusion prevailing in the west on page-1 of the introduction :--
From what I have seen in Afghanistan since 2001 the west is confused about war , trying to win hearts and minds and enforcing rules of engagement that make western troops in Afghanistan sitting ducks.
As an American friend summed it up , we have lost that brutality necessary to win wars and are very confused.
Our author attempts to rationalize and submit to logic a massive human endeavour known as military history.A gargantuan enterprise.He writes fluently and logically but as I read through the book , I could not agree with his logic.Rather I found his logic lopsided and at times unjustified and sweeping.
Naturally I read every page of this massive 729 page book so that no injustice is committed in reviewing the book.
From page-2 my impression was that our writer is a staunch pacifist who hates war :--
On page-6 the writer rightly identifies misperception as a major cause of failure in war :--
The writer delivers judgements with which I could not agree like on page -7 where he claims that the idea of decisive battles became fashionable from 1815 :--
The battle has always been a fascinating topic from time immemorial and the writer does not prove how 1815 was a landmark ?
Again on page-8 one may not agree with his logic :--
Some battles were foregone conclusions like Lees failure at Gettysburg keeping in mind the Union superiority in numbers and logistics was inevitable.
Waterloo was again a foregone conclusion keeping in view the odds that Napoleon was facing .
Military writers should avoid passing such sweeping judgements.
The writer concentrates on land combat and ignores naval powers influence on outcome of battles.
The writers claim about defence on page-10 is again fallacious:--
Defence was never the decisive form of warfare except in Russia where the outcome was decided by space logistics and mechanics.But not so in most other European battles.
Why our writer had to make such a claim needs to be contested ?
On page-12 he was nothing to say about role of naval power in Napoleons ultimate strategic defeat which remains a weak part of the narrative :--
He makes broad brushed like not taking into account the fact that Austro Hungarian army was no match for Moltkes army since Austro Hungarian Army was not a homogenous army and had severe issues of integration.
Similarly he ignores the fact that superior doctrine and tactics played a major role in Franco Prussian war but by First World War due to radical advances in power of defensive weapons the offense as it existed in 1914 had become obsolete.
As I read the book , I realized that the writer was trying to simplify many complicated issues and in the process delivering judgements that were not wholly or sometimes even partially accurate.
What he wrote was good enough to convince the judges to give him a 50,000 USD prize, but not convincing for a military history enthusiast like this scribe ?
On page-14 the writers conclusions are erroneous:--
In Crimea Russia lost and Britain achieved all its objectives and the attrition was not very high , apart from blunders like charge of light brigade.
In US Civil war manoeuvre was alive and the north won because of overwhelming material superiority.
As I read I cannot agree with the authors line of thought and reasoning as on page-15 :--
First World War was entirely different from Franco Prussian war as it was the first major war waged involving the system of alliances woven between 1890 and 1914.
The conclusions on page-16 were valid for France where already there was no space for manoeuvre but there was huge room for manoeuvre on Eastern front even in First world war :--
There was a technical stalemate because of absence of a weapon system that made decisive warfare till the appearance of tanks at Cambrai , but the author does not discuss such matters.
The discussion on page-21 is interesting but Hannibals failure against Rome occurred because he lacked the technical ability to wage siege warfare against Rome.This point whould have been highlighted by the author :--
On page-30 our writer starts reinterpreting history and challenges the previously held belief that Battle of Tours was decisive :---
Here I agree with him in the sense that the French expedition of Ibrahim Al Ghaffaki was more of a private war and not sanctioned as a strategic war by the then caliphs of Islam.
A lot of philosophy in the chapter “The Battle in History” , and much old wine in new bottles.
An interesting chapter but nothing basically new.
In chapter two the Ottoman conquest of much exhausted and isolated Constantinople is glorified out of proportion.
The bottomline is that Ottoman Empire with Constantinople in its hand did not make much impact in Europe and was even defeated by Russia in all wars after 1729.
Vienna was a case of overextended logistics where Ottoman defeat was a foregone conclusion.
The author has an addiction of challenging previously regarded as decisive like Lepanto which he dismisses on page-72 :--
The book lacks good maps which could have been a great aid in better comprehension.
The survey of warfare is not anything new but is a good recapitulation of facts. The authors facts are well argued and described but I take constant exception with his conclusions which can be disputed all along.
The same message could have been conveyed in 300 pages but our author decided to bore us with overwhelming details which are repetition of facts.
His concentration on details while cutting down analysis can be disputed.
He has been unjust with Frerick the Great and dismisses his achievements and victories in sustaining a weaker Prussia surrounded by far stronger enemies as on page- 185:--
What choice did Frederick have with leading a Prussia surrounded by far superior powers (page-286) :--
Much of the writers arguments are truisms that can be used to bring down great commanders.
But since this book is for the layman our author plays to the gallery in being anti war and pacifist.
The author blames Napoleon for his lack of strategy . My question is which strategy could have succeeded against overwhelming British naval power and massive coalitions raised and masterminded by the British against Napoleon .
On page-253 I am not happy to read what he states as if it is a gospel truth :--
The same reactionary regimes collapsed in 1918 because of the size of the armies ?
Historians should avoid delivering Solomonic judgements !
On page 256 I find his criticism of Clausewitz unjustified :--
Nolan finds everyone flawed starting from Charles Martel,Napoleon , Frederick,Clausewitz down to German General Staff and German generals of Second World war.
While this enabled him to win a 50,000 USD prize , I take much of his logic and conclusions with a pinch of salt.
This is a useful book with good description of how things happened but at every place the author has to be refuted for some massive broad brush or sweaping judgement.
This is a good book with good basic facts but many fallacious judgements and conclusions.
Authored by Agha H Amin
6" x 9" (15.24 x 22.86 cm)
Black & White on White paper
ISBN-13: 978-1729770986
ISBN-10: 1729770983
This is a very interesting book that I immediately decided to procure after hearing about it from some friends.
The writer is a seasoned and accomplished historian from Canada.
The book as far as I understand rightfully won a prestigious award -Gilder Lehrman Prize for Military History.
“The $50,000 prize co-sponsored by the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History and the New York Historical Society.”
The writer sums up the confusion prevailing in the west on page-1 of the introduction :--
From what I have seen in Afghanistan since 2001 the west is confused about war , trying to win hearts and minds and enforcing rules of engagement that make western troops in Afghanistan sitting ducks.
As an American friend summed it up , we have lost that brutality necessary to win wars and are very confused.
Our author attempts to rationalize and submit to logic a massive human endeavour known as military history.A gargantuan enterprise.He writes fluently and logically but as I read through the book , I could not agree with his logic.Rather I found his logic lopsided and at times unjustified and sweeping.
Naturally I read every page of this massive 729 page book so that no injustice is committed in reviewing the book.
From page-2 my impression was that our writer is a staunch pacifist who hates war :--
On page-6 the writer rightly identifies misperception as a major cause of failure in war :--
The writer delivers judgements with which I could not agree like on page -7 where he claims that the idea of decisive battles became fashionable from 1815 :--
The battle has always been a fascinating topic from time immemorial and the writer does not prove how 1815 was a landmark ?
Again on page-8 one may not agree with his logic :--
Some battles were foregone conclusions like Lees failure at Gettysburg keeping in mind the Union superiority in numbers and logistics was inevitable.
Waterloo was again a foregone conclusion keeping in view the odds that Napoleon was facing .
Military writers should avoid passing such sweeping judgements.
The writer concentrates on land combat and ignores naval powers influence on outcome of battles.
The writers claim about defence on page-10 is again fallacious:--
Defence was never the decisive form of warfare except in Russia where the outcome was decided by space logistics and mechanics.But not so in most other European battles.
Why our writer had to make such a claim needs to be contested ?
On page-12 he was nothing to say about role of naval power in Napoleons ultimate strategic defeat which remains a weak part of the narrative :--
He makes broad brushed like not taking into account the fact that Austro Hungarian army was no match for Moltkes army since Austro Hungarian Army was not a homogenous army and had severe issues of integration.
Similarly he ignores the fact that superior doctrine and tactics played a major role in Franco Prussian war but by First World War due to radical advances in power of defensive weapons the offense as it existed in 1914 had become obsolete.
As I read the book , I realized that the writer was trying to simplify many complicated issues and in the process delivering judgements that were not wholly or sometimes even partially accurate.
What he wrote was good enough to convince the judges to give him a 50,000 USD prize, but not convincing for a military history enthusiast like this scribe ?
On page-14 the writers conclusions are erroneous:--
In Crimea Russia lost and Britain achieved all its objectives and the attrition was not very high , apart from blunders like charge of light brigade.
In US Civil war manoeuvre was alive and the north won because of overwhelming material superiority.
As I read I cannot agree with the authors line of thought and reasoning as on page-15 :--
First World War was entirely different from Franco Prussian war as it was the first major war waged involving the system of alliances woven between 1890 and 1914.
The conclusions on page-16 were valid for France where already there was no space for manoeuvre but there was huge room for manoeuvre on Eastern front even in First world war :--
There was a technical stalemate because of absence of a weapon system that made decisive warfare till the appearance of tanks at Cambrai , but the author does not discuss such matters.
The discussion on page-21 is interesting but Hannibals failure against Rome occurred because he lacked the technical ability to wage siege warfare against Rome.This point whould have been highlighted by the author :--
On page-30 our writer starts reinterpreting history and challenges the previously held belief that Battle of Tours was decisive :---
Here I agree with him in the sense that the French expedition of Ibrahim Al Ghaffaki was more of a private war and not sanctioned as a strategic war by the then caliphs of Islam.
A lot of philosophy in the chapter “The Battle in History” , and much old wine in new bottles.
An interesting chapter but nothing basically new.
In chapter two the Ottoman conquest of much exhausted and isolated Constantinople is glorified out of proportion.
The bottomline is that Ottoman Empire with Constantinople in its hand did not make much impact in Europe and was even defeated by Russia in all wars after 1729.
Vienna was a case of overextended logistics where Ottoman defeat was a foregone conclusion.
The author has an addiction of challenging previously regarded as decisive like Lepanto which he dismisses on page-72 :--
The book lacks good maps which could have been a great aid in better comprehension.
The survey of warfare is not anything new but is a good recapitulation of facts. The authors facts are well argued and described but I take constant exception with his conclusions which can be disputed all along.
The same message could have been conveyed in 300 pages but our author decided to bore us with overwhelming details which are repetition of facts.
His concentration on details while cutting down analysis can be disputed.
He has been unjust with Frerick the Great and dismisses his achievements and victories in sustaining a weaker Prussia surrounded by far stronger enemies as on page- 185:--
What choice did Frederick have with leading a Prussia surrounded by far superior powers (page-286) :--
Much of the writers arguments are truisms that can be used to bring down great commanders.
But since this book is for the layman our author plays to the gallery in being anti war and pacifist.
The author blames Napoleon for his lack of strategy . My question is which strategy could have succeeded against overwhelming British naval power and massive coalitions raised and masterminded by the British against Napoleon .
On page-253 I am not happy to read what he states as if it is a gospel truth :--
The same reactionary regimes collapsed in 1918 because of the size of the armies ?
Historians should avoid delivering Solomonic judgements !
On page 256 I find his criticism of Clausewitz unjustified :--
Nolan finds everyone flawed starting from Charles Martel,Napoleon , Frederick,Clausewitz down to German General Staff and German generals of Second World war.
While this enabled him to win a 50,000 USD prize , I take much of his logic and conclusions with a pinch of salt.
This is a useful book with good description of how things happened but at every place the author has to be refuted for some massive broad brush or sweaping judgement.
This is a good book with good basic facts but many fallacious judgements and conclusions.